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Highlights
• Illustrates how agribusiness has become the key forest policy definer since 2012 in Brazil
• Uses the case of Brazil to illustrate what happens when forest cover is seen as a threat to the need to
combat global hunger
• Assessment of differing ways of framing sustainability that promote three different pathways of
forest/land use
• Exploration of convergences, conflicts and actor relations between brown economy, green capitalism and
socio-environmentalism
• Brazil provides an important case to study how, in practice, the “brown” and “green” economic pathways
are converging
• Shows how the forest industry has become a key actor in the brown/green capitalism-alliance
Abstract
Typically, forest policy-analysis focuses on the forest industry; however, this article argues that analysis
should take into consideration non-forest economic–political sectors, creating an inter-sectoral analysis of
pathways. An analysis of Brazil's recent forest governance changes allows to outline the political dynamics,
thrust and ideas that most influence the use of forests in a political economy whose overall developmental
and environmental policies are defined primarily by agribusiness. The Brazilian Congress passed a New
Forest Code in 2012, greatly relaxing the previous Code from 1965. The law-changing project was an
illustration of the tension between the large landholders-lobby, and the new sustainability demands of
various sorts of “green economy” proponents. The recent framing of forests by the agribusiness lobby and
the Minister of Agriculture are assessed to explain why and how the understanding and pathway of
sustainability in relation to forest and other land uses has changed since 2012. Studies on the major
impacts of the post-2012 forest laws are also reviewed. A novel approach is taken, uniting an analysis of
large-scale agriculture, tree plantation companies, and socio-environmentalists. It is shown how the New
Forest Code and other measures that have brought together the agricultural and forestry frontiers, policies
and vocabularies in Brazil have made their united analysis necessary. Brazil provides an important case to
study how some parts of the “brown economy” and “green capitalism” pathways are supporting each other











Typically, forest policy-analysis focuses on the forest industry; however, this article argues that it is
essential to look at the most powerful groups of land users in order to understand how forest policies
actually unfold. I analyze Brazil's recent forest governance changes. The focus on Brazil allows me to outline
the political dynamics, thrust and ideas that most influence the use of forests in a political economy whose
overall developmental and environmental policies are defined primarily by agribusiness. This approach
responds to demands within forestry research to include non-forest sectors in the analysis of forest futures
(e.g. Beland Lindahl and Westholm, 2011). It also responds to the argument made in the STEPS' Pathways
approach that we need to analyze critically alternative understandings of sustainability (Scoones, 2015).
The Pathways approach treats sustainability and development as essentially political processes that can be
analyzed as tensions, or struggles, between competing pathways to sustainability (Leach et al., 2010: 157).
The STEPS Pathways approach (Leach et al., 2010) offers a stepwise approach to explore different
Pathways. How and what problems are framed, and by whom, are key questions. The current article has
two goals: 1) to examine how sustainability is framed by the key actors within the dominant forest use
policy in post-2012 Brazil; and 2) to discuss some of the impacts of the different pathways to
Sustainability,1 as assessed by the academic literature. I add to the Pathways-approach by suggesting that
inter-sectoral, or inter-capitalist, analysis of power relations in political economy is essential if we are to
understand how truly unsustainable practices – such as illegal deforestation – are able expand and become
the dominant pathway (of land and forest use policy).
In Brazil, forests have traditionally been relegated to an inferior position in economic decision-making
(Miller, 2007 and Puppim de Oliveira, 2008). In recent years, this process has continued and even gained a
greater hold in the form of expanding large-scale agriculture, mining, energy, and infrastructural projects
(Fearnside, 2008) – deregulating the Forest Code in 2012 being a defining point in this process (Ferreira et
al., 2014). I argue that this development is driven by an alliance of actors that is promoting what I call a
“brown economy”. This pathway is currently suppressing alternative pathways promoted by local forest-
dependent groups.
In order to gain support for reducing forest protection, argue Soares-Filho et al. (2014: 364), the group that
I call the brown economy proponents (principally the agribusiness lobby), started their problem
formulation by claiming that “forest restoration conflicts with agricultural production” (a narrative
which Soares-Filho et al., 2014 and Oliveira and Hecht, 2016, among others, argue to be unfounded). This
framing of the existing challenges in forest policy and the needs for change was successful – and can thus
be considered dominant – as the Forest Code was relaxed. According to many academic studies, the
representation of forest cover maintenance as a huge burden on agricultural producers was a key to
changing the Forest Code and to pursuing other measures supporting agribusiness.2
I also examine a pathway that I call “green capitalism”, which pursues sustainability primarily via a deeper
commoditization and monetization of “natural resources”, for example by internalizing the externalities of
Economics as “environmental services” (seeMoore, 2015 and Baletti, 2014). Brazil provides an important
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case to study how some parts of the “brown economy” and “green capitalism” pathways are supporting
each other in practice, and how the forest industry has become a key actor in this alliance. In practice this is
expressed through tree plantations becoming more valuable and replacing natural forests. Conversion from
primary or secondary natural forests to tree plantation is a topic seldom addressed in the study of
(Brazilian) forest policy. Scholars studying these phenomena typically analyze and write about them as
disparate and non-related issues. However, current political and land use dynamics create stronger links
between these sectors.
2. Theoretical framework and methods
Herein, I use an analytical framework drawing on frame analysis (Perri 6, 2005, Schön and Rein,
1994 and Beland Lindahl, 2008) and the STEPS Pathways approach (Leach et al., 2010). Pathways to
sustainability can be briefly defined as possible trajectories for knowledge, interventions and change that
prioritize different goals, values and functions (Leach et al., 2010). According to Leach et al. (2010), issues
and problems can be framed in diverse ways by different actors. Frames operate on two levels: a)
perception — how we see the world, and b) physical action bias which guides, or delimits, physical action
with material consequences (see Perri 6, 2005).
Frames are not free-floating. Hence, the content of any framing ought to be interpreted in its historical and
political context. Consequently, the first part of the analysis (Section 3), focuses on the historical roots and
key political dynamics of Brazilian forest-use. This is followed by a brief exploration of the range of actors
and pathways that figure in the Brazilian forest policy/land use debate (Section 4). Based on this
exploration, a dominant pathway is identified and explored further in Section 5. The analysis in Section 5 is
divided into assessing: a) problem formulation (the issues that are mentioned as future challenges to
sustainability in the policy); b) policy goals; c) the framing of implementation procedures; and d) outcomes
(how are these described in the policy documents).
The research is primarily based on document analysis and academic literature. The most obvious material
for a study of Brazilian forest policy is the New Forest Code (Federal Law 12.727, 2012), and the subsequent
Provisory Measures, decrees and actions at federal and state levels that have exemplified and
operationalized it. I also consider the public discourses of key forest use actors, focusing on the forest-use
narratives of the Minister of Agriculture Kátia Abreu. The reason for this choice of data is that the
narratives of these key individuals can reveal how forests are being framed in contemporary Brazil by some
of the people in public office with most power in defining land use policies. Op-ed articles, public speeches,
and other not so obvious data sources in Portuguese are used to bring to light the underlying
understanding of forests by the key actors.3
The document analysis is guided by the framework presented in Fig. 1 of Beland Lindahl et al. (2015). The
analysis is supplemented by experiences gained through participant observation and field research since
2003 on the causes of forest cover changes and the expansion of forestry, mining, energy projects and
agriculture in several parts of Brazil. The participant observation was conducted, for example, among
Amazonian traditional cultural groups and indigenous people and their movements and associations, and
within landless movements and forestry, agribusiness and mining companies operating in Brazil. These field
research experiences were essential in developing the heuristic tools (brown economy, green capitalism,
socio-environmentalism) that help in capturing the peculiarities of the Brazilian context, and provide
information about power relations that goes beyond what would be possible solely through document
analysis.
3. Brazil's contemporary forest policy context
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Brazil has a globally unique forest cover (Soares-Filho et al., 2014). It also has a dominant government-
industry alliance with big ambitions to be, for example: the world's top producer of food, feed, fiber and
fuel from soybean (Oliveira, 2016), sugarcane (McKay et al., 2015) and tree plantations (Kröger, 2016); a
key producer of many nonrenewable minerals (Gudynas, 2015); and a champion of hydropower as an
alternative to fossil fuels. As all the above large-scale extractivist4 land uses impact the sustainability of
forest use (Baletti, 2014 and Ferreira et al., 2014), studying them is essential.
I look at how natural forests of different types, particularly those in the central plains (Cerrado) and in the
Amazon (but also elsewhere), have been framed (e.g. in the narratives of Minister Abreu cited in Watts
2014). Interestingly, these forests have been described as a threat to productivity and economy in the
socio-political and economic-environmental paradigm of Brazil, which has been labeled as neo-
developmentalism. This is a new model of social welfare distribution, based on large-scale resource
extraction that has been called neo-extractivism in Latin America (Gudynas, 2015); neo-developmentalism
is the Brazilian version of this model (Kröger, 2012). By increasing extraction and directing some of the
revenues to populations that are in need, neo-developmentalism unites the desires of resource-extracting
elites for greater extraction with the wishes of large groups of the poor to gain access to social welfare. This
new political economic and social paradigm has had severe impacts on forest use practices. For
example Baletti (2014: 6) argues that neo-extractivism's “leftist rhetoric combined with a real reduction in
poverty levels has justified and built support for an economic model rooted in intensified exploitation of
natural and agricultural resources”.
3.1. Forests in the eyes of typical actors within the “brown economy”, “green capitalism”, and “socio-
environmentalism” pathways
The “brown economy” is a concept that builds on Gudynas' (2015) description of the new Latin American
Left governments as “Brown Lefts”, which are neither very red (undertaking deep pro-poor structural or
systemic reforms, e.g. massive land distribution to the landless) nor very green (environmentally friendly),
but which support extractivist projects that leave behind a brown landscape. “brown economy” does not
refer only to the political Left, but can also include the Right-wing: the key feature is the type of landscape
change that is pursued.
I propose also two other helpful analytical categories to study Brazil's forest-reliant (and thus alternative or
non-dominant) land use groups, frames and pathways. First, I study “green capitalism” as a sub-parcel of
the “green economy”. By this “capitalist green economy” concept, I refer to the parts of green economy
that Levidow (2014) has identified as pursuing a techno-environmental Keynesian or a Schumpeterian
green markets agenda.
Second, I study “socio-environmentalists”, which in the Brazilian context refers to actors pursuing inhabited
forested or mosaic countryside (Hecht, 2011). These include, for example, many forest-dwellers in multiple-
use conservation areas, indigenous groups, and other traditional populations, and place-bound social
movements or peasants promoting land reform based on agro-ecological principles. These “socio-
environmentalists” do not typically only leave behind them a green landscape (Hecht, 2011), but also the
people or societies that have lived traditionally in that nature (which “green capitalism” can exclude, as the
work on “green grabbing” has argued [Fairhead et al., 2012]). These groups' preferred pathway to
sustainability relies on peasant-like or subsistence-based use of land for family sustenance, without major
commodification of nature or practices causing forest-cover change (as their culture and livelihoods depend
on these). The concept of “socio-environmentalism” comes from the Brazilian and Latin
American socioambientalismo(s), a broad social movement that does not see nature as an obstacle but
humans as one part of nature (in contrast to the Cartesian dualism, or “nature”–“society” division).
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According to the “socio-environmentalist” perspective, nature (including human beings dwelling on the
local, lived environment) is to be sustained.
Some of the main differences between “socio-environmentalism” and “green capitalism” (as normative-
programmatic frames and pathways associated with forest use) are the propensity of the latter to try to put
a monetary value on nature in terms of “environmental services”; to argue for market-based solutions to
sustainability; and to continue within the ontology of Cartesian dualism by trying to “internalize” the
“externalities” in Economics (Kosoy et al., 2012).5 Note that both the brown economy and green capitalism
proponents have as their goal “development”. However, in the Latin American context of political ecology,
“development” has negative connotations and is associated with negative experiences (Gudynas, 2015).
Thus, many socio-environmentalists argue for a “post-development” pathway, where, for example, the
traditional pursuit of economic growth via GDP or export increases would not be considered to represent
transformations to a sustainable state of affairs.
I have identified above three major groups of actors who promote three alternative (and partly
complementary and conflicting) frames and pathways.6 Social actors can switch between the frames and
pathways they adopt and support, although being strongly conditioned by these (Beland Lindahl et al.,
2015) — I will next discuss more in detail some of the typical actors and their actions that build the
pathways.
3.2. The double movement of increased and relaxed forest protection
“Socio-environmentalism”, as an idea and model of land use, has been framed and turned into
programmatic political agendas, particularly since the creation of the Rubber Tapper's Movement (against
deforestation by cattle-ranchers) of Chico Mendes at the end of the 1980s, seeking a land use policy where
forests and the people living in them were retained (Hecht, 2011). These initiatives promoting (not just
discursively) Sustainable forest policies in Brazil have typically emerged from outside the state, more
precisely from rural social movements (Kröger, 2013). Mobilizations by new social movements and the
actions of progressive state actors led to greater protection for the country's forests in the 1988
Constitution (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007). In the 2000s, several politicians fighting against deforestation
and supporting the rights of forest dwellers were elected to powerful positions. As a result, Brazil enacted
its first Public Forest Management Law (Lei 11.284) after a long deliberative process in 2006 (Banerjee et
al., 2009).7 Particularly during the “Lula” da Silva presidency (2003–2010), large swaths of forestland gained
official recognition as some types of conservation areas, including indigenous reserves. These initiatives
placed 46% of the legal Amazon land area under some protection status, and 60% of these protected lands
were governed by local forest dwelling actors (Hecht, 2011), largely in line with the frames and pathways of
“socio-environmentalism”. Yet, massive deforestation did occur in 2005 in the areas and forest types which
were less well protected: only 7% of the Cerrado and 2.6% of the Atlantic Forest (both of which are
enormously biodiverse biomes) were protected (Soares-Filho et al., 2014).
This period of strengthened regulation to combat deforestation and a generally stronger forest governance
framework were not to last for long. In October 2014, President Dilma Rousseff was elected for a second
term. The close victory was the result of a collaboration of the Left, consisting principally of such powerful
actors within the “socio-environmentalist” alliance as the forest-dwellers movements and landless
movements, supporting her. However, after the election, Rousseff's selection of her Cabinet was a
disappointment to her supporters in the “socio-environmentalist” and even some other “green economy”
groups. She nominated Right-wing politicians famous for their socio-environmentally hostile commentaries
as ministers and high-level bureaucrats.8 Most notoriously, Rousseff nominated Kátia Abreu, the leading
figure of the Rural Caucus (the “agribusiness lobby”) and the President of the Brazilian Confederation of
Agriculture (CNA, a lobby group of large landowners), as her Minister of Agriculture.9 These changes in the
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Cabinet supported the “brown economy” pathway (instead of a socially red and/or environmentally green
economy). As Soares-Filho et al. (2014: 363) explain, the agribusiness lobby used a substantial reduction in
deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon as an argument to propose and push through the New Forest
Code in 2012. The new Code allows a diminution of environmental protection as outlined below.
3.3. The New (2012) Forest Code and subsequent laws
The New Forest Code cut environmental protection in the following ways, as listed by O Comitê em Defesa
das Florestas e do Desenvolvimento Sustentável (2012). The two most important changes were that:
•Illegal land occupations and forest felling before 2008 were subject to an amnesty, and given the title of
“consolidated rural area” (articles 4°, 6°, 11°, 61°, 63° and 67°).
•Over 90% of properties were given amnesty for their environmental debts that would have required them
to restore forests.10
Among other important changes were that:
•Areas of Permanent Protection (APPs), such as forest areas acting as buffers between rivers and
plantations or pastures (Riparian Preservation Areas), were reduced by 80%, from 30–500 m to 5–100 m. 11
•APPs on hills (Hilltop Preservation Areas) were removed to great extent, thus allowing erosion e.g. via
intensive pasture.
•Mangrove-forest occupations prior to June 2008 were subject to an amnesty, and mangrove-protection
areas decreased by 80–50%.
•If owners had not fulfilled the legal requirement of having APPs, there was an amnesty for many (but not
for all — there were specific conditions).
•Non-native species can now be used to “restore” natural habitats in the cases where illegal deforestation
is detected, and this can be done elsewhere.
•A significant decentralization of power took place, giving governors the power to create or dismantle APPs
for example.
On the deforestation-curbing side, the government launched the new CAR-system of Rural Environmental
Registry, becoming obligatory by 2017, as a way of monitoring via satellite imagery that the new (relaxed)
rules are being followed, and that illegal logging does not take place. If a property does not have a CAR, it
cannot receive credit from banks, for example (Law 12.651/2012, §29).
Since 2012, the cutting of environmental regulation has gone even deeper, through state legislations that
implement the New Forest Code, such as the PL 219 that resulted in State Law 15.684 in 14 January 2015 in
the state of São Paulo. This is a representative state-level forest law that offers implementation procedures
for landholders. PROAM,Instituto Brasileiro de Protecao Ambiental, considers that law 15.684 dramatically
worsens the environmental legislation even in comparison to the 2012 Forest Code. 12Law 15.684 allows,
for example: 1) creating (supposedly compensatory) Legal Reserves outside of that state where forest is
being cut, and thus allows 2) large properties to escape the requirement to maintain Legal Reserves; and 3)
endangers the conservation of Cerrados. 13 4) Properties are given 20 years to replant any deforested areas,
and replanting may include exotic tree monocultures (such as genetically modified eucalyptus) and low-
densities.14 For these and other reasons, PROAM considers that Law 15.684 repealed the only State Law
that made it obligatory to recompose native vegetation in Riparian Preservation Areas following the
technical criteria considered correct by Brazil's scientific community.15
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I have identified three major land use groups promoting three competing and partly overlapping frames
and pathways. The socio-environmentalist alliance is now under severe attack while an alliance of actors
promoting brown economy is gaining influence and power to realize a land conversion-pathway. Here, I
want to explore these developments in greater detail. Therefore, I have chosen to focus on the framing of
sustainability by those behind the revision of the Forest Code. I direct attention towards the brown
economy coalition — a group of social actors who share a brown economy perspective which in turn
supports a brown economy pathway.
4. Different pathways of forest use, the groups behind them, and their interaction
The ways in which the power balance and links between the pathways of the brown and green capitalist
economy have been transformed by the New Forest Code merit further examination, as do the key social
actors who support the above pathways (via particular framings), and the conflicts and convergences
between these pathways.
4.1. Arguments defending the “brown economy” perspective
According to the brown economy proponents who want to expand plantations “to feed the world”, “only”
about 19% of the Brazilian Amazon rainforest has been lost according to the official INPE data,16 while in
Western Europe much more forest was cut down historically (see Moore, 2015). Between 1550 and 1970,
less than 1% of the Amazon was deforested. Following the establishment of “brown economy” supporters
in dominant positions in the Brazilian government, an attitude of “we have the right to do the same as
others” has come to dictate discussions of forest-use ethics in Brazil. The proponents of the “brown
economy” suggest that neo-extractivism is a way to secure greater social welfare for large urban
populations and democratic majorities, through offering better infrastructure, wages and social security
schemes (Gudynas, 2015). The “brown economy” ends up framing “socio-environmentalist” approaches as
being minoritarian or representing localist tendencies that are not ethical due to the sparse population
density in forestlands (needed to pursue “development”, “food security”, and “Brazil's growth”, for
example).
4.2. Biodiversity versus climate-change mitigating forest perspectives
There is a wide division within Brazilian forest policy-planning and the implementation of state bureaucracy
between those favoring policies that prioritize biodiversity-maximization; and those prioritizing carbon
emission-cutting and carbon “storage” (Donadelli, 2014). These two goals are increasingly difficult to
reconcile, as illustrated, for example, by the debate around offering CDM (United Nation's Carbon
Development Mechanism) credits for industrial tree plantations (Plantar, a Minas Gerais-based tree
plantation-company, was the first in the world to receive CDM credits), displacing biodiversity-rich areas
with tree monocultures (Overbeek et al., 2012). The biodiversity-frame, in alignment with “socio-
environmentalism”, is weaker than climate change-mitigation, because it clashes more strongly with the
economic interests of agribusiness, mining and energy industries. The proponents of the biodiversity
perspective are typically the lower social stratum of society, whose livelihoods depend on non-wood based
forest products, agro-ecological farming, and/or indigenous ways of life.
4.3. Schisms between “green capitalism” and “socio-environmentalism”
The implicit understanding in “green capitalism” is that capitalism can be accompanied by protection of
nature, and can even be used as tool to deliver this aim — and that this is in fact the only realistic way to
combat unsustainable land uses. Advocates of “green capitalism” argue that economic argumentation, or
creation of large-scale investment alternatives, work best in the Brazilian context to convince the most
powerful economic groups to divest from forest-depleting expansion into alternatives. In practice it has
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been hard for the “green capitalists” to convince the popular rural social movements to join them. The
underlying schism between the two perspectives partly explains why this is so. Many rural movements are
deeply engaged in Liberation Theology-inspired grassroots-socialism, where market mechanisms such as
REDD are eschewed, and capitalism is seen as being based on the plundering of nature. In fact, the “green
capitalism” pathway has meant more tree plantations, dams and tradable “environmental services” from
conservation areas and fewer rural mosaics (Baletti, 2014). Some indigenous groups, however, are siding
increasingly with the most powerful “green economy” proponents, in order to receive remuneration for
retaining forest cover.
5. Assessing Brazil's dominant forest policy
After having identified the range of frames and pathways in the broader debate on land/forest use, I now
want to investigate which one could be said to dominate current Brazilian forest policy — and how. I assess
policy documents but also talk about various actors, their statements and their activities, resulting in a
broader policy analysis (and not simply a document analysis). I assess how “green capitalism” supporters,
and the forest industry, are increasingly ending up supporting (knowingly or unknowingly) the “brown
economy” pathway and alliance, while “socio-environmentalists” are under huge new pressure, including
the threat of violence, to cede their lands to the two other approaches and their proponents.
5.1. Problem formulation: how are future challenges addressed?
In line with the frame analysis outlined in Fig. 1 in Beland Lindahl et al. (2015), my analysis here starts by
exploring how problems are formulated within Brazil's dominant forest policy. In relation to problem
formulation, agribusiness and industrial forestry's frames and goals converge, which has helped to create
the new forest policy.
5.1.1. Agribusiness
In 2012, there were other major events in Brazil besides the New Forest Code that changed the framing of
key terms related to forest sustainability. Rio + 20, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development, was supported by the leader of organized agribusiness, Kátia Abreu, as it was “the first time
that an environmental conference has included the food question”. 17 This move placed “agriculture” as a
concept covered by “environmental sustainability”, and allowed agriculture to be discussed as a form of
environmentalism. After this point, the narratives of Abreu that use the word “environment” seem to have
actually focused on talking about increasing agricultural production and particularly agribusiness exports
(her main goal), this move suggests the appropriation of the sustainability narrative to further the goals of
the dominant (forest) land use policy. The changed meaning given to “environment” (as actually meaning
agriculture in Abreu's narrative) is visible for example in what she went on to say in the BBC interview with
her on Rio + 20 (from which the above quote also comes): “We want to showcase all our projects in the
environmental area, our low-carbon agricultural production techniques, which nobody else in the world is
doing. I have travelled the entire world and encountered people in awe of Brazil's potential for the
production of food”. 18
5.1.2. Industrial forestry
Agribusiness was not the only powerful actor suggesting that the existing Forest Code is in need of change.
Industrial forestry companies operating in Brazil had been lobbying for years to be included under the laxer
environmental rules and greater support enjoyed by agriculture, and thus it was natural for them to ally
themselves with agribusiness (Kröger, 2013). The tree plantation lobby achieved its goal, and also a more
profound transformation of the definition of what constitutes “agriculture” and “forestry”. The New Forest
Code frames “forestry activities, when undertaken in areas suitable for alternative uses of the soil, to equal
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agricultural activity” (author's translation from Portuguese). Consolidating and specifying this provision, on
11 December 2014 the Brazilian Congress passed the Decree 8.375/2014 (“Defining an Agricultural Policy
for Planted Forests”).
This new law has hardly been remarked upon. As a result of it, what the law calls “planted forests” can
receive the far more flexible legislative benefits and larger amounts of credit that agriculture has enjoyed in
Brazil, in comparison to forestry activities in natural forests (or before, in “planted forests”). As one
reflection of how the new vocabulary has been incorporated into the language of policy
practitioners, Querubini Gonçalves (2014), a lawyer, wrote that after Decree 8.375 “the agricultural activity
of forestry will occupy a new status of importance in Brazil's agrarian sector” (2014, my italics, no page
numbers).
In the New Forest Code, “planted forests” are no longer under the regulation of the Ministry of
Environment, but of the Ministry of Agriculture. The recent laws together allow for a gradual
transformation of native forests into planted forests, moving large swaths of land with trees under the
power of the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, that Ministry needs to be studied in detail by those wishing to
understand Brazil's forest policy. In particular, the framing of forests by the Minister of Agriculture is an
essential issue when analyzing the sustainability of Brazil's forest policy.
5.2. What are the goals and how are they organized, justified and embedded?
The goal of Minister Abreu and the “brown economy” is that Brazil would become the world's largest bulk
food producer, surpassing the U.S. All factors that are considered as obstacles to the enlargement of
agribusiness are framed as being hostile to a key national (and global) project. Socio-environmentalists
have given Abreu several nicknames such as “the Chainsaw Queen” and “Miss Deforestation” for her
newspaper articles in which she demands that more highways be built in the Amazon, that indigenous
territory-creation rights from the President to the Congress are abandoned, and for more planting of
intensive monocultures, and terminator GM-crops (Watts, 2014). Socio-environmental activists, on the
other hand, are labeled by the CNA (though its president, Abreu) as being led by foreign interests who do
not want to see Brazil develop and grow. In this framing, forests and the people defending them are, in
Abreu's weighty words, “problems that the agriculture sector faces” (cf. Watts, 2014). Abreu's self-set price
for helping Rousseff to govern the country (which is impossible without the support of the powerful Rural
Caucus) was for Rousseff
“to understand our situation … [and problems] and to help solve those problems so we can keep growing …
We cannot rest on our laurels. There are many things holding back progress – the environmental issue, the
Indian issue and more. But even with these problems we keep achieving high levels of productivity. Imagine
how high they might be without those obstacles” (cf. Watts, 2014).
The framing of forests as a threat and burden has been justified in repeated media articles and news stories
in the leading media outlets, such as O Globo channels and theFolha de São Paulo journal, where Abreu was
a columnist until the end of 2014. In 12 May 2012, Abreu argued in her Folha de São Paulo column that
Brazil needs to adopt the New Forest Code, as 6.2 million ha of land will be allegedly needed for new
cultivation by 2022 for the country to be able to increase grain production by 30%.19 The main argument
used by the CNA to urge President Rousseff to participate in dismantling the protection afforded by the
Permanent Reserve Areas was that that the price of bulk food would otherwise increase, as there would be
no space for expansion. This would go directly against the goal of social equity and eradication of hunger.
In 27 September 2014 Abreu wrote about how disgusted she was with the word “deforestation”. According
to Abreu the word deforestation has been used before elections as an “environmentalist opium” to blame
Brazil and “farmers” wrongly for something that other countries are culpable of, and of which the
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“farmers” are not guilty of.20 This framing is embedded in the long history of Brazilian modernization
narratives and pathways, where forests are an unruly obstacle to be removed by “work” and “technology”,
and where all who are considered to oppose this project are labeled as “ideological”. The framing below by
Abreu, from her column, illustrates this type of justification of the dominant forest policy, which is based on
an attack on environmentalists:21
The word deforestation has been given a pejorative connotation, as if it signifies a voluntary and wanton
destruction of nature. Although this could take place, especially when property is not protected, as
happens with the illegal loggers in the Amazon, the reality is very different. If we eat, it is because land has
been cultivated and not left in its natural state. Food does not fall from heaven, but is a product of the long
work of developing the land. Beautiful, productive landscapes are the result of this transformation of
nature. Human beings must be fed and there is a constantly increasing demand for food across the globe.
Hunger must be reduced, since the scandal of poverty cannot be tolerated anymore. Even the FAO has
alerted the world to the urgency of this question. The global food situation does not allow for ideological
approaches. The land must be developed with technology to increase productivity to serve human beings,
and Brazil will surely play a key role in this process…
In this framing, forests are not portrayed as sources of food, but as mere obstacles, a vile land use form
whose existence, alongside acts of defending forests and maintaining forest cover are framed as morally
intolerable as they hamper “food production”. This goal and its justification are mostly consistent among
those with the greatest power in economic decision-making in Brazil, including prominent Leftist politicians,
although major goal conflicts do exist particularly with the “socio-environmentalisms”.
5.3. What are the suggested means to implement the goals?
5.3.1. Establishing new commodity chains
There are many ways to implement the goal of increasing productivity via the expansion of the agricultural,
mining and energy frontiers. The Brazilian state Development Bank, BNDES, is a key tool, used to transfer
credits to infrastructure and other projects that make the expansion possible (Kröger, 2015). Other banks
also help in this process.
There is also support from foreign buyers, particularly in China, the EU, and the US. The Four Big
agribusiness multinationals, the so-called ABCD: ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Dreyfus, who account for
between 75% and 90% of global grain trade, take care of the global commodity chain, in conjunction with
the government and large landholders (Oliveira, 2016). The government, under President Rousseff, a
former minister of Mines and Energy and according to Abreu having a better understanding and
appreciation of agriculture than Lula, pushed for new highly contentious large-scale projects as the keys to
implement the goals above: for example the establishment of dams for energy production and mines on
the Tapajós and other rivers, this government–corporate agency demonstrating multiple arrays of frontier
expansion (Kröger and Lalander, 2016).
Besides new investments in “developmental” projects, the goal of + 6 million ha of forest being turned into
plantations is framed as achievable by further deregulation. Abreu has demanded that FUNAI, the Brazilian
Indian Agency, be stripped of its power to demarcate (and retain) indigenous lands, and to also allow for
“developing” of other forest areas.
5.3.2. Appropriation of nature by re-classification and quantification
In the “new”, “nonexistent” and/or “catastrophic” Forest Code (as many analysts call the current legal
situation concerning forests, see da Veiga, 2013), the main measures of implementation are based on the
principal underlying tasks of capitalism, that is, mapping, quantifying, making calculable, and thus
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governable, nature as “natural resources”. Moore (2015) has argued that such new ideas and ways of
quantifying and coding nature precede the rise of capitalism. The New Forest Code is a huge calculative,
quantifying operation, the largest attempt to actually record all rural properties and make sense of the
messy situation where, if all the “rural properties” in different Brazilian private but official land registry-
offices (cartórios) are added together, the country's land area does not suffice (overlapping claims being
rampant due to land grabbing).
First, the new Code offers as a carrot Payments for Environmental Services (PSAs) to those who simply
follow the law. According to da Veiga, who has written extensively on the New Code, this type of
sustainability approach “is a great reasoning if we were not in a capitalist society”.22 Yet, PSAs have been
also argued to be a potentially fruitful tool to expand conservation in Brazil's difficult setting, where it has
been almost impossible to actually implement the Forest Codes due to the resistance by local politicians
who favor agriculture (Young and de Bakker, 2014).23
Second, all properties must be registered under CAR, Rural Environmental Registry: the state can thus tax
these properties (currently the great majority of rural properties do not exist in state registries and thus do
not pay taxes) and monitor them. CAR has been considered the only positive opportunity for supporting
sustainability in the new Code, if well implemented.24 This allows increasing taxation and economic growth
via the deeper penetration of (state-monitored) capitalism into the countryside. However, in this setting, it
will remain much easier to quantify (and tax) agricultural monocrop production than the myriad bio-diverse
natural products of forests, suggesting that expansion of capitalism via re-classification of key categories is
crucial to implement the main goals.
5.4. How are outcomes presented, and assessed by research?
In the dominant forest policy, the outcome is expressed in terms of the increase in value of agricultural
production and exports (see e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture's Plano Agrícola e Pecuaria 2013/2014), 25 by
expansion of plantations, pasturelands, mines and energy projects (visible e.g. in the framing of ways to
attain the goals described above by Minister Abreu, emphasizing the need to grab over 6 Mha from forests
for plantations). In contrast, maintenance or an expansion of protected areas or non-agribusiness, non-
mining or non-hydropower land uses, are presented as obstacles to development. In the presentation of
outcomes, deforestation, land grabbing, slavery, and other forms of violence are denied, hushed-up, or if
they are acknowledged, a limited assessment protocol is suggested (Zhouri and Valencio, 2014).
Considering Sustainability, many aspects of the New Forest Code and other post-2012 policies are highly
problematic, and I will next discuss some impacts that researchers have already examined.
5.4.1. Deforestation outcomes
The 2012 Forest Code gave an amnesty for illegal deforestation to 90% of rural properties and reduced the
Hilltop Preservation Areas (on hilltops, at high elevations, and on steep slopes) by 87% (Soares-Filho et al.,
2014: 363–4). Soares-Filho et al. (2014: 364) found that after 2012, deforestation rates “ceased to decline
in the Amazon and Atlantic Forest, and surged in the Cerrado” and that the Code “will allow additional
deforestation”. Imazon, O Instituto do Homem e Meio Ambiente da Amazônia, a leading non-governmental
research institute, announced on 27 December 2014 that the rate of deforestation in the Legal Amazon was
427% higher during the month of November 2014 than during November 2013: the destruction of
“degraded forests” increased by 855% (they also suggest that the real rates may be even higher, as only
67% of the land area was under surveillance). 26 The official government figures by PRODES also show a
notable increase in deforestation in the legal Amazon of 27.6% between the yearly figures for 2012
(4571 km2) and 2015 (5831 km2).27
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5.4.2. Changed moral economy
There are other problems besides increased deforestation in the post-2012 dominant pathway. Given that
it is commonplace and very easy to split one's property into smaller farms, so as not to be under the
obligation to have legal forest reserves, and that an amnesty was granted retrospectively for criminal acts,
land speculators and illegal logging appear to be being supported politically and consistently in the moral
economy of forest use. In the absence of political will, the new opportunities for monitoring and legislative
tools such as CAR will not be used. It is also worth noting that if CAR is implemented, this will be a boost to
the “green capitalist” approach to conceptualizing nature. As Soares-Filho et al. (2014: 364) note,
implementing the CAR “could create a trading market for forested lands, adding monetary value to native
vegetation”. This move would consolidate the position of the “brown economy” by legitimizing their
actions and tying the “green capitalism” group to their project, in contravention to “socio-
environmentalism”. According to government figures, by September 2015, about 60% of the CAR lands had
been registered.28
5.4.3. Decentralization of power
The 2012 Code also relaxed forest protection requirements on small properties to almost nothing. One
more worrying change was a strong decentralization of decision-making from the Federal government to
the states, offering new power particularly to governors. In the São Paulo state, for example, the 2015 Law
15.68429 further relaxed forest protection standards, cutting regulations in the state-level Forest
Code.30 Thus, the new forest policy gives greater leeway for pursuing rapid GDP growth via increasing
activities that deplete the forest.
5.4.4. More tree plantations
The argument of industrial forestry has thus far been that industrial tree plantations would decrease
natural forest cutting (a claim that has not been proved in any studies, see e.g.Nahuelhual et al.,
2012 and Kröger, 2014), and that they would retain half of their land area for conservation, which is no
longer the obligation (nor has this ever been the case). In the context of Brazil, such claims have never been
true, either for the pulp industry that has cut large areas of the Atlantic rainforest and other forests
(Kröger, 2013), or for charcoal operations that are supposedly aimed at decreasing carbon emissions and
native forest cuts but in practice ending up dramatically increasing both of these (Sonter et al., 2015).
Despite these facts, the new Forest Code allows an increase in both of these activities; furthermore, it
creates new mechanisms that will give added financial incentives to plantation forestry via payments to
these for “forest carbon” and “ecosystem services”.
5.4.5. Increased speculation
The New Forest Code also distorted the categories of land control, these reconceptualizations of legal
categories show how deeply embedded sustainability is into the political economy. The new basic category
of land control is “rural property”. This classification covers 70% of Brazilian territory, but does not
necessarily have anything to do with production, existing often merely for speculative purposes, e.g. in the
form of false deeds of land ownerships in the Amazon. “Agricultural establishments”, an alternative basic
unit of land ownership, cover less than 40% of Brazil: these can be observed by satellite as they represent
those areas of land used for agriculture. According to da Veiga (2013), the twisting of the New Code to take
as principal legal entities “rural properties” and not “agricultural establishments” shows that the main goal
of the new Code and the subsequent Provisory Measures was to legalize and allow for far greater
speculation and future legal deforestation.
5.4.6. Water scarcity
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Researchers have already noted by empirical studies that the drastic reduction in APP requirements
(Permanent Preservation Areas) has led to major problems in river basins, leading to severe water scarcity
in the past years (Guimarães et al., 2015). Guimarães et al. (2015) argue by the case of São Paulo that
capitalist sectors' unwillingness to leave out land serving for planting as APPs is leading to a very difficult
scenario where the provisioning of fundamental basics for sustaining life, such as water, cannot be
guaranteed.
5.4.7. Conglomeration of industrial forestry and agribusiness practices and interests
Tree plantation companies are finding themselves to be in a key position in the new trade of “forest
restoration” requirements, as they can make deals with agricultural landholders to take care of their
restoration requirements (and they can also do carbon offset deals to allow deforestation-caused emissions
by agriculture). The field trip descriptions of two participants (Jeffries and Heald, 2016) in an event called
New Generation Plantations NGP 2016 Encounter, organized by WWF-Brazil, Fibria and Suzano in March
2016 in São Paulo, offers an empirical example of how the agricultural and forestry sectors (and the brown
and capitalist green economy) are currently converging:31
“In the Mata Atlantica (Atlantic rainforest) area we were visiting, landowners have to restore at least 20%
of their land. Some are willing to do a deal with plantation companies – they will lease some of their land
for eucalyptus plantations if the company also takes on the restoration commitment. As a result, large
plantation companies like Fibria and Suzano have built up a lot of expertise in forest restoration.”
This process of conglomeration supports both the expansion of tree plantations and agriculture. A
particularly noteworthy issue is that the practice of planting single-species plantations first and then
thinning their trees for industrial purposes, allowing native species to grow under the shade, is a common
and growing practice in “forest restoration” in Brazil (Rodrigues et al., 2011). There are clear synergies here,
but very few have pointed out the potential problems associated with this model of forest restoration by
relying on large tree plantation companies. For one, the legitimacy of tree plantations increases, and
second, the power and intermeshing of forestry vis-à-vis the agricultural sector augments.
6. Discussion
The recent policy changes suggest that, in Brazil, deforestation as an economically compensated and
politically protected land use is gaining impetus, in spite of increasing environmental consciousness
worldwide. Those groups who had, for centuries, been used to being able to do whatever they wanted with
land wished to dismantle the 1965 Forest Code, in the face of it actually starting to be implemented and
relied on in the first decade of the twenty-first century as a result of regulatory moves.
The deepening of Brazil's dominant forest policy perspective since the 2012 Forest Code relaxation has
given rise to a pathway of deforestation: in this framing of sustainability, agribusiness concerns about food
production surpass the forest-based alternative involving food production, biodiversity and protection of
traditional cultures and livelihoods that natural forests provide. The rift from the global framing of
Sustainability as based on avoiding deforestation (Pülzl et al., 2014) becomes understandable if we examine
the Brazilian case as a symptom of the country's political economic power divisions, where the Rural
Caucus of large rural landholders with new capitalist ways of intensifying land use and expanding
production push the agribusiness frontier, and thus deforest the lands that they crave (Kröger, 2015). The
growth in the power of “socio-environmentalism” in the 2000s – visible in increased indigenous and
traditional population-controlled territories with legal backing and socio-environmental sustainability in
land/forest use – is now being met by a counter-movement.
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These points suggest that it is essential to consider political economy and agribusiness to understand the
current forest policies. Brazilian agribusiness' and industrial forestry's attack on forests – these being
framed in the attack as a “hindrance” to global social equity in the form of cheap food – have allowed
agribusiness to legitimize their model of production and land use, including both huge cattle-ranches with
vacant pasture lands and industrial plantations, as the most ethical, just and important activity.
The framing of forests (and their inhabitants) as a problem has also served another goal: to steer attention
away from the actions and inaction of large landholders, particularly the maintenance of properties which
they did not want to divide. Deforestation was not a necessity, as Brazil has other land available (Soares-
Filho et al., 2014). The weakening of the forest laws is directly linked to the long political struggle of trying
to avoid agrarian reform that would involve land tenure redistribution. If the new forest laws had not been
approved, there could have been demands for deforestation to be paid for by the current “owners”, who
could be forced to provide recompose for the areas of forest that were destroyed.
Da Veiga (2013) argues that the principal beneficiaries of what he calls “the destruction of the Forest Code”
in 2012 were the real estate and land speculators who had appropriated the Cerrado since 1999. In 1999,
the Law of Environmental Crimes was passed: but the New Forest Code eradicated the 10 years between
1999 and 2008, legally speaking, thus legitimizing what were illegal activities during this period. The actual
goals of the new Code were to avoid payments for deforestation, and the need to legalize land grabs and
forest destruction in past (pre-2008) years.
In 2014, Kátia Abreu declared that she has turned from a fierce critic of the Workers' Party under Lula to an
ally of the Worker's Party under Rousseff: this happened, according to her, when she saw that in her first
2.5 years Dilma had won back to CNA and agribusiness the losses that they had had to face during the
previous 20 years when the demands of environmental protection and social movements were being
incorporated into the legal framework and land use changes.32
7. Conclusions
This article has examined the differing forest framings and pathways present in the policy changes and
conflicts with respect to land use in post-2012 Brazil. I built on the Pathways-approach (Leach et al., 2007)
to investigate how forest policy is defined in a setting where the use of forests is primarily not decided by
forest-based policies or groups, but by other sectors. I took a novel approach, uniting an analysis of
deforestation activities and industrial tree plantations. Typically, the groups of scholars interested in these
areas have remained separate. However, the New Forest Code and other measures that have brought
together the agricultural and forestry frontiers, policies and vocabularies in Brazil have made their united
analysis necessary. In fact, this article, being first of this kind, has demonstrated that agriculture and
forestry are closer than ever in their forest policy framings.
In Brazil, agriculture, mining and energy generation groups have more power to decide what happens with
respect to forest cover, and how forest sustainability is framed, than forest-dependent people or forest
industries. In this setting, the dominant agribusiness framing of natural forests as a hindrance to
development – a “brown economy” pathway – has found an ally in industrial forestry, legitimizing tree
plantations by framing them in the New Forest Code as “forests” (for environmentalists) and
simultaneously as “agriculture” (to increase production). At the same time, the “brown economy”, through
its new land use laws, has allowed these tree-planting companies that consider themselves the proponents
of a “green economy” to be governed as agriculture, and thus able to escape the stricter forest
preservation quotas under which the forestry-sector operated under when still governed as forestry.
The Brazilian example suggests that it is essential to study the political economy as a whole, and consider
inter-sectoral linkages, when studying a given policy-arena whose differing pathways to sustainability are
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analyzed. An inter-sectoral, inter-capitalist analysis, where the role of civil society and the state with their
various actors, such as the government and bureaucratic institutions, are included, is essential in the study
of any sector. Following the Pathways-approach, different countries and actors are seen to promote
different understandings of, and pathways to, sustainability, and the power of these also varies. In Brazil,
there is a myriad of globally pioneering socio-environmental sustainability-promoting forest-based sub-
pathways within the socioambientalismoapproach, and these gained power spectacularly during the 2000s.
But with the rise of global food security as a simply-understood framing of ethical land use, these gains in
alternative pathways have become obstacles to the dominant pathway. The resurgence of the resource
frontier, ensured by dismantling environmental laws and enshrined in the forestry-agribusiness-non-
renewable industries alliance in a “brown economy”, is consuming the space required for maintaining and
deepening the Sustainability pathways offered by the socio-environmentalist approaches.
Brazil provides a case to illustrate how forest-pathways to sustainability can be relegated to a secondary
position if the most powerful land controlling actors present forests as a threat. The “brown economy” sees
forests as an obstacle to “food security”-based agribusiness expansion, global capitalism's need for new
mineral resources, and energy production, while the “green capitalism” prioritizes carbon capture over
biodiversity and inhabited forests. These framings of sustainability seem to carry an increased weight in
defining the forest and land use policies in Brazil, and I do not suppose that Brazil is an isolated case.
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